Buy-to-let after Section 24 — the real numbers at each tax band
The 2017 introduction of Section 24 fundamentally changed the economics of leveraged buy-to-let for higher-rate taxpayers. Many articles about BTL profitability still use pre-2017 logic. This guide does the actual post-Section 24 maths.
What Section 24 actually changed
Before 2017, landlords could deduct mortgage interest as a business expense, paying tax only on net profit (rent minus mortgage interest minus other costs). A higher-rate taxpayer with rent of £12,000 and mortgage interest of £8,000 paid 40% tax on £4,000 profit — £1,600.
Since 2020 (full phase-in), the deduction is gone. Tax is paid on gross rental income minus allowable costs (but NOT mortgage interest). A basic rate tax credit is then applied equivalent to 20% of mortgage interest. The maths for higher-rate taxpayers is materially different.
The same example post-Section 24
Rent: £12,000. Mortgage interest: £8,000. Other allowable costs: £1,500. Taxable income: £12,000 − £1,500 = £10,500. Tax at 40%: £4,200. Less basic rate credit: £8,000 × 20% = £1,600. Net tax: £2,600. Compare to the pre-S24 tax of £1,600 — that's 63% more tax on the same property with the same rent and mortgage.
Who is affected most
Higher and additional rate taxpayers with leveraged properties (large mortgages relative to property value) are worst affected. Basic rate taxpayers are less affected — they pay 20% tax and receive a 20% credit, so the credit largely neutralises the charge. Limited company structures avoid Section 24 (companies can still deduct mortgage interest) but introduce corporation tax, dividend tax, and additional complexity.
Stress-testing your own numbers
The applies correct post-Section 24 treatment at your tax band, showing net yield after mortgage, maintenance, voids and tax — and compares it to investing the deposit instead.
What the data shows
Independent analysis consistently shows that leveraged BTL at higher-rate tax bands in high-price, low-yield areas (London, South East) produces net yields below what a diversified index fund would return on the same capital — without the concentration risk, illiquidity, and management overhead of direct property ownership. In lower-price, higher-yield areas the case is stronger — but Section 24 still materially reduces returns compared to pre-2017 projections.